The future of UK foreign policy: the world we face, and the world we would create by Cooper, Robert
  
Robert Cooper 
The future of UK foreign policy: the world 








Cooper, Robert (2010) The future of UK foreign policy: the world we face, and the world we 
would create. IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SR006. LSE IDEAS, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43548/ 
 
Originally available from LSE IDEAS 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2012 
 
© 2010 The Author 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 




The World We Face, and the 
World We Would Create
Mr Robert Cooper
Those who have dreamed of a perpetual peace have always been woken from their deep sleep by the roar of bombs. The natural condition of mankind is conflict and the natural 
condition of the state is war. 
There are enough examples: Afghanistan, the Congo, Sudan over many years, not so long ago the 
Balkans. And risks are all around: in the Middle East, in South Asia, in the frozen conflicts in Europe, 
in the unpredictable activities of North Korea. 
But something strange has happened: in amongst all these problems there is not the faintest smell of 
great power conflict. That is all the more strange when we consider that many of today’s troubled places 
were in the past the scene of great power rivalry. Britain and France contested Sudan; the Balkans, where 
World War I began, has become a place where great powers cooperate to try and quieten conflict; 
and the six powers who try without success to reduce risks in the Korean peninsular are the same six 
who in various combinations fought three devastating wars there. Another six powers work together 
on Iran; Russia is part of the Quartet that backs US efforts at peace in Palestine. It is now more than 
fifty years since there was a great power War and we seem to live in a different world. Can it last?
There are three possible causes of this long peace. First is American supremacy. The USA is so far ahead 
of every other country in military capability that it makes no sense for any other country to consider 
contesting its position. Great power peace through unipolarity. Yet here is a paradox since the massive 
military capability that guarantees a US victory in any battle with its peers has not enabled it to master 
an impoverished country one tenth of its size. 
The second explanation is the existence of nuclear weapons: a war to the death among great powers 
would become a nuclear war; and, fortunately, we seem to have understood that this would always 
be a war without winners. Great power peace through mutually assured destruction. 
Third, there is globalization. The nineteenth century liberals, such as Cobden and Bright, believed that 
free trade would lead to peace because trade was more profitable than war. The premise was right but 
the conclusion proved wrong. But perhaps they were just ahead of their time. Perhaps we have now 
reached a critical mass of global prosperity from which we cannot retreat. Today a hint of trouble on 
the other side of the world shocks the financial markets, and causes cancellations in tourist bookings. 
What is more, the success of governments and the legitimacy of political systems seem to depend 
more on individual prosperity than on national glory. Deng Xiaoping’s remark that it is glorious to be 
rich marked the turning point. Peace through mutually assured prosperity.
Or perhaps not. But when we remember the misery that war brings we ought to resolve to do everything 
possible to turn this long interlude into something more permanent. There must be a chance of doing 
this. And the recipe is not expensive. First we must preserve, for a time at least, American supremacy. 
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Only the Americans themselves can do that, and 
it will be achieved not by the kind of sentiments 
expressed in this short essay but by the powerful, 
primitive national emotions that in their time have 
made the world a dark and dangerous place. For a 
while at least this does not seem difficult. Americans 
still want a strong defence and America’s lead if so 
great, its accumulation of technology, experience 
and material so far beyond any other country, that 
the next ten or twenty years – probably more - 
are guaranteed.
Second we must retain nuclear weapons: that looks 
all too easy. And we must retain the memory of what 
war, especially nuclear war, means. The real risk is 
not from the established nuclear powers, but that 
one of the not-yet-quite-a-great-powers like India or 
Pakistan might demonstrate that lesser powers today 
can cause great power levels of destruction. So we 
must transmit the memory to others too.
Finally, hardest of all, we must keep the global 
economy dynamic, regulated to avoid catastrophic 
shocks, and above all we must keep it open.
That however is not enough. Reason and materialism 
have not yet conquered national passion. At regular 
intervals we see incidents in the South China Sea or 
around the many disputed islands that could set off 
a chain reaction that might prove uncontrollable. 
If we are to keep safe the system which, perhaps 
by accident, we have built, it will need more rules 
than it has now. Only common understandings can 
keep ourselves safe from ourselves: solutions for 
Taiwan, agreements about behaviour on the high 
seas, understandings about where the high seas 
begin and end, agreements on who owns which bit 
of coral reef. Just as markets need regulation so do 
political relations. In Europe agreements about land 
borders took several centuries of war to reach. We 
must hope that young countries in Asia grow old 
more quickly.
That is not all. Dealing with climate change is going 
to require an unprecedented level of cooperation. 
And all this must happen just when the international 
scene has widened to include a greater variety of 
countries and cultures; a moment when, for the first 
time, great powers may also be developing countries, 
grown greater than their former colonial masters; 
and their memories are not so much of war as of 
colonial humiliation.
All wars are dangerous; the civil wars of collapsing 
states risk creating terrorists that plague our peace, 
make airports ever more unpleasant and government 
ever more intrusive. But great power wars today 
would be like nothing we have ever thought of. It 
may be that the dream of a lasting peace is hopelessly 
naïve; but the alternative is unthinkable. Perhaps 
the best we could realistically hope for would 
be that we might stumble through quarrels and 
crises and misunderstandings and brinkmanship, 
as we did during the Cold War, and arrive at some 
approximation of this condition.
What if we succeed? What would the world look 
like? This is an important question since if we want 
to achieve a seemingly impossible dream will have 
to plan for it and know how its constituent parts 
look. One thing is certain: it cannot look too much 
like the 19th century, which was after all a century 
of great power conflict. That rules out the balance 
of power and the threat of war as an organizing 
principle. It does not however make military power 
irrelevant: US military dominance may be one of 
the vital elements guarding the peace; but its role 
would be to prevent rivalry rather than to contest it. 
And rivalry would mostly take other forms, primarily 
economic, as seems largely to be the case today. 
Military power, like nuclear weapons, would be a 
part of the background rather than a factor in the 
everyday hierarchy of nations – though it would 
give the USA a special position as the provider of 
the reserve currency of power long after the dollar 
has lost its position.
America’s position as the dominant military power will 
be a source of power, but not, as it was in the past, 
because it threatens others. Rather it would bring 
authority for the USA as the most important provider 
of global security. Hard power will matter because it 
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brings soft power: not force but influence. Because 
security is the most important of all public goods the 
USA will remain the most important power. But it will 
be only one power among many, and the measure of 
each will be its contribution to global public goods. 
These take many forms, from the less significant roles 
such as the provision of accepted standards for food 
safety, to critical public goods such as leadership in 
climate change, or in setting standards in financial 
markets, or providing a reliable reserve currency. 
(Thus today Germany is more important than other 
European countries because of its role in sustaining 
the Euro). Honour and power will go above all to 
those who can create the rules and institutions of 
global governance. It is not after all so glorious to be 
rich, though it is pleasant. But just rich means being 
nouveau riche. Those who also want influence and 
respect must contribute to the community, take risks 
for it, provide it financial resources or social capital 
by bringing countries together for the difficult task 
of making it all work. That is what glory will mean 
in a less militarised world. 
Leadership will be all the more valued because it 
will be much more difficult than the leadership that 
America gave the West, or France and Germany 
have given the European Union. The big players 
are more diverse, more suspicious, more jealous. As 
always the most important global public good will 
be trust. Gradually we may even change our view 
of the state from the Weberian definition - the body 
which has the monopoly on force - to one more in 
keeping with the times: the body which has the local 
monopoly on making rules – since that will be the 
most important contribution each will have to deliver 
to the global system.
This is a fantasy world but we must imagine it if we 
want to bring it about. A British government which 
is quietly but sensibly giving up pretensions to a 
global military role should think about how it can win 
honour and influence in other areas. There are many 
where it has something to offer. One is intelligence, 
still an important component of global security and 
one where quality is as important as size. The UK has 
made a distinguished contribution in the past and 
can do so in the future too. Intelligence on nuclear 
proliferation, terrorism and cyber attack will be all 
the more important in a world where conventional 
war is less salient. In most other areas – rule making, 
standard setting, guarantee giving – size will matter 
and here the UK, like it or not will have to work with 
others, notably the European Union. That is perhaps 
bad news for some. But the good news is that the 
UK brings to the EU the hard headed sense of power 
and purpose that it sometimes lacks and can, when 
it chooses, exercise a decisive influence. ■
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